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ABSTRACT: In this article, we analyze the application of options contract in the special commodity 
supply chain such as fresh agricultural products. This problem is discussed from the point of the retailer. 
When spot market and future market are both available, we discuss how the retailer chooses the optimal 
production. Furthermore, overconfidence is introduced to the supply chain of the fresh agricultural 
products, which has not happened before. Then，based on the overconfidence of the retailer, we explore 
how overconfidence affects the supply chain system under different circumstances. At last, we get the 
conclusion that different overconfidence level has different affection on retailer’s optimal ordering 
quantity and profit. 
KEYWORDS: fresh agricultural product; overconfidence; options contract; freshness; ordering 
strategy. 
1. Introduction 
Agriculture is the basic department in one country’s economy, supporting all human’s life. Nearly 
all nations’ governments pay more attention to the development of agriculture. In the No.1 document, it 
is proposed to speed up the development of the distribution channels of agriculture products, to improve 
the grades and levels of the circulation of them. It also emphasized that we need to make full use of the 
modern information technology, give full play to the agriculture future market to guide the production 
and averse the risk. The fresh agricultural products are the necessities in our daily life. It is very 
important for our health. With the development of our economy, we require more in freshness. 
Furthermore, developing fresh agriculture products is also an important method to enhance the income of 
the peasants. As one kind of special products, fresh agriculture products are featured with deteriorated 
and perished. Some may be wasted when circulating. In order to speed up the circulation of them and 
reduce wastage, some scholars research them in the point of supply chain. Cai
[1]
 brought management of 
supply chain to the field of fresh agriculture, studied the coordination of fresh agricultural supply chain 
under the condition of pricing FOB. Chen Jun, Dan Bin etc. 
[2]
 introduced the freshness attenuation law 
to the agriculture product inventory model for deteriorating, which is expressed by the form of 
exponential function , explored the multi-level price discounts order policy of suppliers under the 
elasticity of demand condition. Wang lei and Li Yuyu 
[3]
 established the consumer utility model with 
considering the freshness, price and time variation, then, analyzed the retailer's optimal order strategy. 
Under the condition of the single three-stage supply chain, Lin Lue etc. 
[4]
 analyzed supply chain 
coordination of fresh agriculture product with time limited. Finally they gave the conclusion that the 
revenue sharing contract can be effectively coordinated.  
With the deepening study of supply chain, more and more scholars introduce options into the supply 
chain. Barnes Schuster etc.
[5]
studied the application of options contracts in the two-stage supply chain 
system, in which the demand is correlated, reflecting the flexibility of options under uncertain conditions. 
Ritchken PH etc.
[6] 
proposed that options contract is one form of contracts combining option with the 
traditional ordering methods. To a certain degree, it can improve the flexibility of supply chain, as well 
as strengthen cooperation in the supply chain. Chen Xiangfeng, Zhu Chenbo etc.
 [7]
 introduced options 
into the supply chain procurement, explained the process of adjusting the interests of all parties of the 
supply chain and risk-sharing by using option. Ning Zhong and Lin Bin 
[8]
 studied the application of 
stand-alone option mechanism and embedded options mechanism in supply chain management, analyzed 
the effects of options contract in supply chain performance, pointed out that the options could achieve 
the effect of revenue sharing and risk sharing. Many scholars also studied the supply chain of fresh 
agricultural products. Wang Jing etc. 
[9]
 drew options contract into fresh agricultural products, analyzed 
the wholesalers’ ordering policies both in the spot market and future market at the same time, and 
obtained the optimal order quantities under the combination of both two kinds of markets. The defect of 
the article is ignoring the analysis of stock after introducing it. 
Nowadays the wholesalers and retailers are more and more powerful than before, the dominance of 
the market has changed to some extent. However, some scholars’ model designs lack rationality. 
Furthermore, former studies are based on the assumption of rational people, ignoring their behavioral 
characteristics and other irrational factors, such as overconfidence and so on. In actual transactions, the 
participants tend to be over-confident and more optimistic of their own abilities, knowledge, and 
predictions about the future performance
[10]
.Based on the above considerations, this paper attempts to 
establish a more reasonable model to analyze the optimal ordering policy of fresh agricultural product in 
the view of retailers. 
2. Model Description 
The model is explored by a retailer and a supplier of single-cycle supply chain 
system, circulating with fresh and perishable agricultural product. This paper is analyzed from the 
point of the retailer. The retailer can purchase the order both in the spot market and the option market. 
In the process of cooperation, the retailer decides the option price and the executed price 
[11]
, the 
supplier can ensure all orders of the retailer according to the contract. What’s more, the retailer is 
overconfident of the market demand. In order to facilitate discussion, now the parameters of the model 
and their meanings are explained as follows: 
w: wholesale price, p :sale price of fresh product, g: out of stock cost, x: the demand of product,  : 
expectation of market demand, 0c : option premium, ec : executed price of option,  : the loss of fresh 
agricultural products in the unloading and transportation process, 0 1  , : freshness of products, 
0 1  , T: circle of ordering, 
1Q : when the options contract is made by the wholesaler, the order 
quantity in the spot market by one cycle, 
qQ : when the options contract is made by the supplier, the 
order quantity in the future market by one cycle, ( )F x : the cumulative distribution function of fresh 
agricultural product market demand,  f x : the probability density function of fresh agricultural 
product market demand, ( )rF x : the cumulative distribution function of the market demand of fresh 
agricultural product  recognized by the wholesaler,  rf x :the probability density function of fresh 
agricultural product market demand recognized by the wholesaler. 
Underlying assumptions are as follows: 
(1) k presents the level of overconfidence of the retailer, k x  is the demand of the market recognized 
by the retailer, when 0 1k  , it tells the retailer’s cognition of adverse signals of market demand, 
when 1k  , it presents the retailer’s cognition of favorable signals about the market demand.  
(2) The initial inventory is zero, and the fresh agricultural products are not returnable, which is 
determined by their characteristics, and the remaining residual value is very small, they can 
be considered to be zero. 
(3) The shortage cost is transferred to the supplier by virtue of the retailer’s strong negotiation skills. 
(4) 0 0ew c c  , otherwise, retailers will order all the products in the options market. 
3. Model analysis 
3.1 The supplier’s outcome policies  
As the follower, the retailer determines its own ordering quantity to maximize its profit. Therefore, 
the retailer's expected profit can be expressed as: 
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Proposition 1: When the supplier supports the shortage cost, its optimal outcome of fresh 
agriculture product is 
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Proof：We take a derivative with respect to qQ 、 1Q , there is 
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Put (2) in (1), the retailer’s optimal expected profit can be written as follows: 
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Under the condition of decentralized decision making, the supplier’s profit is：
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Then, its expected profit is 
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3.2 Analysis of the impact of overconfidence 
3.2.1 Impact of Overconfidence on retailer’s ordering quantity 
Proposition2: the optimal total ordering quantity and spot market quantity are increasing 
function of overconfidence level. 
When the retailer is entirely rational, it can judge the real demand of the market, according to the 
real demand, it decides its ordering quantity. So, the totally rational retailer’s profit is as follows: 
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Then, we can get the totally rational retailer’s optimal ordering quantities: 
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Compared the expression (2) to (7), we know that the optimal total ordering quantity and spot market 
ordering quantity are both linear functions of the level of overconfidence k, there is a positive correlation 
between k and optimal total ordering quantity. It can be expressed as follows: When a favorable signal is 
shown on the market, it means k> 1, the higher level of overconfidence of the retailer is, the greater 
*Q
and
*
1Q are; When there are adverse market signals, that is to say 0< k <1, more overconfident the 
retailer is, smaller 
*Q and *1Q are. Option ordering quantity has no relationship with overconfidence 
coefficient. 
(2). Impact of Overconfidence on supplier’s profit 
From the optimal ordering quantities and optimal outcome, we could get 
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Proposition 3：Because of the overconfidence of the retailer, the profit of supplier is not stable. 
That is to say its profit is very easy to change. 
Proof: compared the two kinds of profit, we know 
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When 0<k<1，
0 1 0s sE E   ，the retailer’s overconfidence will reduce the supplier’s profit. 
What’s more, the higher the overconfidence level is, the smaller the supplier’s profit is. When k>1,
0 1 0s sE E   , the retailer’s overconfidence will improve the supplier’s profit. 
3.3 The optimal decisions under Centralized decision-making condition  
Under centralized decision-making, we aims to research on the whole supply chain performance status. At 
this point, as the decision maker, the supplier treats maximizing profit of the whole supply chain as the goal, 
to decide the optimal production. By assumes, we know that the supplier is fully rational, so the whole 
supply chain profit can be expressed as: 
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3.4 Control and adjustment of retailer’s overconfidence level  
When the retailer is overconfident about the market demand of fresh agricultural product, the 
interests of both sides will change with the level of retailer's overconfidence. At this time, the supply 
chain as a whole does not reach the best situation. What's more, the fluctuation in the level of 
overconfidence is not conducive to the cooperation between the two sides. It is necessary to find a 
suitable way to eliminate the impact of retailer's overconfidence. Croson
 [12]
 designed a buy-back 
contract and wholesale-price contract to eliminate the retailer's overconfidence in general supply chain. 
Due to the higher requirements of fresh agricultural product, the perishable feature determines the 
products cannot be returned. As a flexible tool, options can be used to achieve the coordination of the 
supply chain. In this article, we attempt to use the option contract to control the retailer's overconfidence, 
so as to coordinate the fresh agriculture supply chain at last. 
Proposition 4: when 0c and ec satisfy
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Furthermore，according to (12), the anti correlation exists in option price and the overconfidence 
coefficient, the higher the retailers' overconfidence level is, the smaller the option price. 
4. Numerical example 
Her we use matlab7.0 to do the numerical analysis. Assume there is a supermarket ordering fresh 
fish from a supplier. They can finish the trade both in the spot market or the option market. Here we just 
analyze the profit of the supermarket. We assume that the market demand is subject to normal 
distribution. Wholesale price
0 25w  , sale price p =50, out of stock cost g=10, 0.1  , 0.8  , the 
fresh agriculture product demand obeys uniform distribution between (0,100), the initial option price 
0 5c  ，then 
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established, the optimal order quantity Q  and market order
1Q
can be calculated. By calculating, the 
relationship between optimal order quantities and the overconfident coefficient can be described as 
follows:： * *
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The relationship among the variables is reflected in graphs as follows: 
 Pic1: the relationship between ec and k             Pic2: the relationship between 0c and k                                                                                                                                          
 
Pic3: the relationship between 
*
1Q and k          Pic4: the relationship between s and k 
Figure 1 and figure 2 show that the option price and the executed price of option are increasing 
functions of overconfidence level k, they have the same changing direction of overconfidence coefficient. 
Figure 3 shows that on the premise of realizing supply chain coordination, when k = 1, namely when the 
retailer is perfectly rational, its spot order is minimum; When the retailer’s overconfidence exists, the 
physical quantity is greater than rational, and the higher the retailer’s overconfidence level is, the larger 
its spot ordering quantity is. Figure 4 shows that when the market appears negative signals, the more 
rational the retailer is, the greater the profits of the supplier is; and when the market is in a good 
indication, the higher the retailer’s overconfidence level, the greater the profits of supplier. By analysis 
of the above situation, we know it is consistent with theoretical model and actual situation. 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper changes the mode of the traditional supply chain that the retailer is fully rational, in fact, 
the irrational factors are always exiting, such as overconfidence. In this article we analyzed the impact of 
overconfidence on the fresh agriculture product supply chain. Furthermore, based on the influence of the 
retailer’s overconfidence on the prediction of market demand, we analyzed the case of the wholesaler 
setting options, how the overconfident coefficient affects the optimal quantities and the profits as well as 
how the optimal ordering quantity varies. Finally, we could draw the conclusion that the optimal order 
quantities are related to the level of overconfidence. When the prospect of market is good, 
overconfidence of the retailer has a positive effect, and vise verse. Nowadays, with the buyers’ status and 
role gradually improving, the initiative also correspondingly increases in the market. By the way, they 
will develop more options contracts which are conducive to themselves. This article just analyses the 
single-cycle, one-to-one mode of supply chain, so more detailed and deeper research could be made 
about order strategy of fresh agricultural products. 
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